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Since its inception, the European Union has been facing several challenges. The
economic and refugee crises, along with the results of the British referendum, have
shaped the future of Europe in the past decade. These challenges among others have
encouraged the emergence of populist parties, which aim at disrupting the current status
quo posing threats to democracy. In this context, the consolidation of digital media has
played a key role in the circulation of populist messages to a large number of people.
Such messages have questioned the political and legitimacy terms of the European
Union, leading to the ideal scenario of Euroscepticism. This article examines the framing
and communication strategies used by the European populist actors regarding the
European Union and Euroscepticism. The aim is to identify if there are any significant
ideological differences. The sample consists of the shared messages (n = 3,667) by the
main European populist political parties of Spain, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom
during the European Parliament election campaign in 2019. The messages published
on the Twitter accounts of Podemos, Vox, the 5 Star Movement, Lega, Rassemblement
National, France Insoumise, The Brexit Party, and the UKIP have been analyzed. Results
show that two types of Eurosceptic discourse were detected depending on the ideology.
The right-wing populists pose a Euroscepticism exclusionary discourse, based on the
loss of sovereignty and the distinction of “they”—“us,” excluding the out-groups whereas
the left-wing populists present a Euroscepticism inclusive discourse, to maintain the
foundational values of Europe, such as equality or solidarity between different people and
countries. This research found that Eurosceptic discourse is used in the communicative
strategy of populist political parties on Twitter and highlights the importance of the
message frame which makes the difference about it.
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INTRODUCTION
The electoral success of several populist political parties has
increased the news coverage along with the academic interest
in populism. In Italy, the 5 Star Movement was the most voted
political option in the 2018 elections and ended up ruling with
the Liga (Chiaramonte et al., 2018). In France, in the 2017
presidential elections, the National Front obtained 7.5 million
votes and made it to the second round, something that had never
happened before (Ivaldi, 2018). In Spain, Podemos emerged in
the 2014 European elections, consolidating its political strength
by winning 79 seats in the Spanish Parliament in 2016 (Casero-
Ripollés et al., 2016). In Britain, the UKIP advocated the
celebration of Brexit, a referendum the purpose of which was to
leave the European Union (Usherwood, 2019).
Populism is a varied phenomenon. This fact makes it
an interesting topic to explore within the European context.
There are differences regarding populism ideology. In particular,
there are differences in its political–historical development or
its programmatic proposals. Not only differences regarding
populism ideology can be found, but also concerning their
political trajectory or their programmatic proposals (Caiani
and Graziano, 2016). There are different approaches to study
the populism. Some authors consider it a form of political
organization based on the presence of a charismatic leader
who raises his government with the direct support of the
people (Taggart, 2000; Weyland, 2001). Others consider it a
communicative style (Jagers andWalgrave, 2007; Bos et al., 2010,
2011; Moffitt, 2016; Block and Negrine, 2017). Populism has
also been defined as a way to construct the political (Laclau,
2005; Hawkins, 2010) and as a set of ideas (Rovira Kaltwasser
and Taggart, 2016; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017). However, a
large number of researchers define populism as a thin-centered
ideology (Canovan, 2002; Abts and Rummens, 2007; Mudde,
2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Aalberg and de Vreese,
2017). That is to say, a moldable ideology that can be adapted to
a multitude of contexts and that considers that society is divided
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people
and the corrupt elite, and that maintains that politics should be
the expression of the general will (Mudde, 2004).
Despite being a difficult concept to define, populism has
undoubtedly marked the political debate of recent decades. For
this reason, some authors argue that Western democracies are
immersed in a populist Zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004). That is, we are
immersed in a populist period dominated by the emergence and
development of new populist movements, both left, and right-
wing. These movements want to break the status quo that has
prevailed up to the present (Gerbaudo, 2018) and take advantage
of the political opportunity structure to do it (Hall, 2000). In
this context, popular sovereignty functions as a link between
left-wing and right-wing populist political actors (Gerbaudo,
2017). In both cases, they seek to regain control of their territory
and restore the loss of autonomy in an extremely globalized
world, in which membership in supranational organizations
such as the European Union, deprives them of the ability to
legislate in their own countries. In this sense, some populist
political actors consider borders to be essential to maintain
sovereignty (Wallerstein, 2004) since in their fight against the
establishment is the only way to reclaim popular sovereignty
(Rooduijn, 2014; Hameleers, 2018). According to Butler (2014),
popular sovereignty is an act of self-assignment carried out by
the people and is not linked to any political authority or regime.
In this context, the idea of sovereignty, in any of its forms, falls
on a precarious process of citizens, an aspect that reinforces the
demand for hard physical and cultural borders, exposing their
vulnerability (Lorey, 2015).
The rise of populism in European democracies have escalated
due to the economic crisis, the refugee crisis and the results of
the British referendum. In the debate generated around Brexit,
there was already talk of the need to establish borders and create
tough immigration policies so as not to undermine the well-being
of the British people, building the idea of sovereignty around
precariousness and xenophobia (Pencheva and Maronitis, 2018).
All these events have affected the future of Europe during the last
decade (Bergbauer et al., 2019). These crises have intensified the
level of partisan competition in European elections, aggravating
the level of politicization of European affairs and increasing
the level of pessimism among voters, and paved the way for
the emergence of an ideal scenario for Eurosceptic political
actors (Ivaldi, 2018), that oppose the principles, institutions or
policies legislated in the European Union (Leconte, 2010). This
is an especially favorable context for the radical-right populist
parties, who base their communicative strategy on questioning
the functioning of the European Union as we know it today.
In addition, Europe has suffered a crisis of values that
caused many citizens to question several defining elements of
the European Union and even the permanence in it. This
aspect is included in the manifestos of a large number of
the populist parties (Vasilopoulou, 2018). According to Mudde
(2007), populist parties are not against the founding principles
of the European Union, but against those who manage the
institution. In other words, Euroscepticism translates into
criticism of certain policies promoted by the European Union,
but not in reprobating the institution itself. In that sense, we can
make a distinction between the different economic and social
dimensions of Euroscepticism (van Klingeren et al., 2013) as,
for example, economic Euroscepticism, common among left and
right populists (van Elsas et al., 2016), or cultural Euroscepticism
that can focus on the national sovereignty (Mammone, 2009;
Gerbaudo, 2017, 2018) or the distinction between us and them
in reference to immigrants (Kriesi, 2007; Leconte, 2010; Wodak,
2015; Fuchs, 2017). However, some authors argue that both
dimensions of Euroscepticism are interconnected (McLaren,
2006). Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) discern between “soft” and
“hard” forms of Euroscepticism. In this context, the opposition
to the European Union policies is considered a “soft” form,
meanwhile opposition to the process of European integration
itself is regarded as a “hard” form of Euroscepticism.
In this context, as with other actors outside the establishment,
such as social movements (Casero-Ripollés and Feenstra, 2012;
Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés, 2016), some authors believe
that the success of populism is related to its communicative
strategy (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Casero-Ripollés et al., 2017;
Engesser et al., 2017a; de Vreese et al., 2018). Populist political
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org 2 August 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 54
Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés Populism Against Europe Social Media
parties dependmore on themedia than the consolidated ones due
to their weak organization (Aalberg and de Vreese, 2017). In the
1990s, the most widely medium used by populist political options
to spread its messages was television (Mazzoleni, 2008). In
general, they took advantage of the coverage of the sensationalist
media to obtain more visibility and increase their number of
voters (Mazzoleni, 2003). However, social media is nowadays a
powerful tool for them, since they can communicate directly with
their followers andmobilize them (Bartlett et al., 2011). This way,
they can spread their messages to a large number of users with a
click (Kriesi, 2014).
Twitter has become the reference platform for political actors
among social media. According to the study made by Burson-
Marsteller (2018), 97% of world leaders have an account on
this social media, 4 points above Facebook and 16 more than
Instagram. Thus, Twitter has become an essential channel for
populist political actors since allows them to communicate with
the people quickly, easily and directly (Esser et al., 2017), as well
as setting up their agenda and frames (Gainous and Wagner,
2014; Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés, 2018; Alonso-Muñoz,
2019).
For this reason, the following research questions have
been posed:
RQ1. Is Euroscepticism present in the communicative
strategies of populist political actors on Twitter regardless of
their ideology?
RQ2. Are there differences in the way of framing messages
related to the European political project on Twitter based on
the ideology of populist political parties?
DATA AND METHODS
To know the framing and communication strategies used by the
European populist actors regarding the European Union and
Euroscepticism, a qualitative analysis method has been used.
On the one hand, critical discourse analysis is applied (Wodak
and Meyer, 2003; van Dijk, 2012; Flesher Fominaya, 2015). This
type of analysis understands discourse as a form of symbolic
power. In this context, discourse is considered to be a great
conditioner of public opinion and, therefore, a key tool in the
social construction of reality (van Dijk, 2006). In addition, to
know under which parameters the messages about the European
Union were framed, the study on framing by Entman (1993)
has been used. This study establishes four basic functions: (1)
definition of the problem: determine what a causal agent is doing,
(2) attribution of responsibilities: identify the forces creating the
problem, (3) moral assessment: evaluate causal agents and their
effect, and (4) possible solution: offer and justify treatments for
the problems.
The sample of this research is composed of messages posted
on Twitter by eight European populist political parties during
the campaign of the European Parliament elections held in
May 2019. Given that the elections were not held on the same
day in all countries, and that the beginning of the campaign
was not the same for everyone, it has been decided to analyze
all the messages published between May 1 and 31, 2019. In
particular, tweets published by Podemos and Vox (Spain), the
5 Star Movement and the Lega (Italy), Rassemblement National
and France Insoumise (France), and the UKIP and The Brexit
Party (United Kingdom) have been analyzed. The choice of the
sample responds to the fact that they are parties from four similar
countries in terms of size and political relevance in Europe.
In addition, according to data published by the International
Monetary Fund, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain are
four of the main European world powers.
Tweets have been downloaded using the Twitonomy web
application, which in its premium version allows downloading
tweets, retweets and replies from the selected Twitter accounts.
A total amount of 12,104 messages were collected, of which
3,667 were analyzed, including both tweets and replies (Table 1).
Retweets have not been studied in this research as they are
useless to help achieve the objective of this research, which
focuses on the creation of discourse and not on the strategy of
content circulation.
RESULTS
Contextual Sphere: The Opportunity
Structure of Populist Political Actors
As with other actors, the success of populist political actors
is closely related to both political and discursive opportunity
structures. The political opportunity structure (POS) refers to
the conditions of the political environment that offer incentives
for actors who are not part of the establishment, such as social
movements, to participate in political decision-making (Tarrow,
1994; Kriesi, 1995). In this regard, Gamson (2004, p. 249) adds
that the POS is “the playing field where the context is set.”
On the other hand, the discursive opportunity structure (DOS)
determines the possibilities of a message to be disseminated
in the public sphere (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Specifically,
visibility—depending on the number of channels in which it is
disseminated—the impact understood as the degree of reactions
generated by a message, and legitimacy—determined by the
degree of positive reactions—are the three most determining
characteristics for a message to be successful (Koopmans and
Olzak, 2004). This implies that the socio-political context has
an important influence on the triumph or failure of the actions
TABLE 1 | Distribution of the sample.
Country Account Tweets analyzed
Spain Podemos (@ahorapodemos) 455
Vox (@vox_es) 314
Italy Movimento 5 Stelle (@Mov5Stelle) 279
Lega (@LegaSalvini) 585
France Rassemblement National (@RNational_off) 634
France Insoumise (@FranceInsoumise) 811
United Kingdom UKIP (@UKIP) 373
The Brexit Party (@brexitparty_uk) 216
Total 3,667
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carried out by populist actors. Likewise, the context also has an
impact in discursive terms as it can condition the decoding of
a message since the understanding of a subject by citizens is
determined by the context in which it is received (van Dijk, 2003,
2006).
The 2019 European Parliament Elections were held in a
context of strong political disaffection. According to data from
Standard Eurobarometer 90 (2018), 48% of Europeans were not
interested in those elections. In addition, the citizens surveyed
indicated, both before and after the elections were held, that
some of their main concerns regarding the European Union
were immigration (40% in 2018 and 34% in 2019), terrorism
(19% in 2018 and 18% in 2019) and the economic situation
(18% in both periods) (Eurobarometer, 20181, 20192). Thus,
the economic crisis, the refugee crisis and the results of the
British referendum have been affecting the future of Europe
during the last decade. These events have intensified the level
of partisan competition in the European elections, aggravating
the level of politicization of European affairs and increasing the
level of pessimism among voters, creating an ideal scenario for
Eurosceptic political actors (Ivaldi, 2018). In this context, the
2019 European elections were held, which were characterized by
the rise of populist parties, especially those of the extreme right,
who conducted an electoral campaign based on Euroscepticism
and the idea that the EuropeanUnion as we know it doesn’t work.
In addition to using the POS and the DOS, Engesser
et al. (2017a) consider that populism also uses the online
opportunity structure. This means that populism thrives on
the inherent values within the digital media system to
promote communication.
Conventional media, such as television, press, and radio, offer
political actors a form of contact with citizens (Krämer, 2014).
However, it is very difficult for populist actors to pass the filter
of journalists and release their messages without restrictions
(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Web 2.0 and social media, on
the other hand, allow them to circumvent conventional media
(Atton, 2006; Bartlett et al., 2011; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013;
Casero-Ripollés et al., 2017; Engesser et al., 2017a), making it
easier for their messages to reach citizens directly (Bennett and
Manheim, 2006; Vaccari and Valeriani, 2015). Populist politicians
capitalize on the power and influence of social media in the
formation of citizen opinions by disseminating populist ideas,
such as the elite attack or the defense of the people (Engesser
et al., 2017b). Gerbaudo (2014) branded this phenomenon
“Populism 2.0.”
In this regard, some authors recognize that homophilia is
cultivated in the digital environment. In other words, different
individuals who have the same political views or similar beliefs
and thoughts create bonds (Colleoni et al., 2014; Guerrero-Solé,
2018). This is another factor that favors the communication of
populist actors, together with the fact that the internet and social
media function as an echo chamber for the political elites as
exclusively their ideas become relevant (Jackson and Lilleker,
2011; Verweij, 2012; Graham et al., 2013), while the dissonant
1Standard Eurobarometer 90 (November 2018), https://bit.ly/2T3YOyN
2Standard Eurobarometer 91 (June 2019), https://bit.ly/39TwJQD
voices are relegated to other spheres. Using these characteristics,
they can ratify and amplify the messages that go against those
groups or minorities that, according to these actors, have no place
in society and, therefore, are not part of the people (Sunstein,
2001; Jamieson and Cappella, 2008).
Discursive Sphere: Discursive Strategy of
Populist Political Actors
The analysis of the messages published on the Twitter accounts of
the selected political parties indicates that their communicative
strategy in this social media platform is articulated around the
four functions of framing defined by Entman (1993): definition
of the problem, attribution of responsibilities, moral assessment
of the facts, and approach to a solution.
Spain: Vox and Podemos
In Spain, European, regional and municipal elections were held
on the same day. In this regard, during May 2019, the period
analyzed, both Vox and Podemos prioritized the publication of
messages concerning national policy on their Twitter accounts
rather than presenting European proposals.
Vox’s discourse regarding the European project on Twitter
highlights that the main problem of belonging to a supranational
organization such as the European Union is the loss of national
sovereignty. In this regard, they allege that “Spain cannot limit
itself to be a province of Brussels” and that the European
Union is “taking away powers that correspond to the sovereign
states.” In addition, they argue that Spanish sovereignty cannot
be questioned by the rest of member states, something that
the president of the Spanish government must watch over. The
Spanish right-wing populist party emphasizes that the culprits of
this situation are the heads of state of certainMember States, such
as Angela Merkel (Germany) or Emmanuel Macron (France),
who are only looking for their interests, and not for those of
the whole of the European Union. This is what Vox calls the
“oligarchy of Brussels.” In this context, Vox raises a discourse
based on the differentiation between us, the people, and them,
the Brussels elite that oppresses the sovereign people.
Among the consequences of the loss of sovereignty, Vox
highlights the fact that member states are forced to open their
borders for free movement of people, an aspect they disagree
with, given that they openly oppose immigration. In this regard,
when referring to the current refugee crisis in Europe, the
candidate for the European elections, Jorge Buxadé, argues that
the first thing is to check whether all migrants trying to enter
Europe are indeed refugees. Therefore, it is essential that every
member state develop asylum policies, each establishing its
criteria and conditions to enter and remain in the country.
For Vox, the solution is to “stand up to the oligarchy of
Brussels” and carry out a “comprehensive reform” of Europe, a
total re-foundation to take power away from Brussels and give
it back to the member states of the European Union. Against
those who propose the federalization of Europe, Vox defends a
European Union in which the states decide for themselves and
legislate considering their interests. Thus, nationsmust cooperate
freely and not receive Brussels guidelines. In this regard, they
provide the case of Carles Puigdemont as an example. The former
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president of the Generalitat de Catalunya fled from Spain to
Belgium after the celebration of the independence referendum
and the proclamation, and subsequent suspense, of the Catalan
Republic. Vox considers that Spain has been harmed by Brussels
inferences as they allowed Puigdemont, whom they branded
as “the coup leader” to become a “refugee for the European
authorities.” In this sense, they strongly criticize the euro order
system that exists today. Vox argues that Europe should not
question the justice of one of its member states, as a German
court did after ruling that the facts that justified Puigdemont’s
request for surrender by rebellion did not entail such a crime
in Germany.
For Podemos, on the other hand, all the problems that
Europe suffers are a consequence of the strong crisis that the
European model is suffering today. Specifically, the Spanish left-
wing populist party, in its communication strategy on Twitter,
considers that the austerity policies demanded by the European
Union have caused a strong crisis of the social model, have
weakened the political parties and have generated a strong
territorial crisis causing confrontation among the different states
that conform the European Union.
In this sense, Podemos blames austerity policies promoted
by the European Parliament for everything that is happening in
Europe right now since they have proved to be “highly ineffective”
as they have impoverished citizens. Thus, they argue that both
Brexit and the emergence of the extreme right are both the result
of “austerity” economic policies and the mismanagement of the
refugee crisis.
Therefore, against those who intend to keep current Europe
at the service of markets such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel
Macron, Podemos wants a Europe that defends the rights
of citizens. Although dissatisfied with the functioning of the
institution, they argue that the solution is the redefinition of
the European Union to provide citizens a more relevant role so
that they can be part of the decision-making process that affects
them so much. For this reason, they are defined as “Eurocritics”
as oppose to “Eurosceptics” who are represented by figures like
Mateo Salvini or Victor Orban. In this sense, Podemos is running
a campaign to try to mobilize the left-wing electorate to stop the
extreme right and to prevent it from conquering Europe.
To face all the problems that the European Union is
experiencing, it is necessary to take action to recover its
foundational values: democracy, peace, freedom and solidarity
among States. Only by voting left, “can we build a Europe of the
peoples, made of solidarity, antifascist, democratic, feminist, with
rights for all, and with an economy that does not leave anybody
behind.” To achieve a “fairer Europe,” they present on Twitter a
decalogue of actions that focused on two issues: climate change
and immigration. Using the slogan “there is no spare planet,”
they advocate the creation of a “conscious and environmentalist
Europe that actively fights against climate change.” According to
the argument on Twitter of Podemos, for this to be possible the
decisions taken in Europe must not respond to economic lobbies,
but the good of citizens. Regarding immigration, they establish
that it is necessary “to build bridges, not walls.” For this, it is
essential “to create legal and safe ways for migrants” to migrate
without putting their lives at risk as happens with those who try
to cross the Mediterranean Sea daily and lose their lives. It is
also necessary to end the “hot returns” as happens in Spain with
those migrants who try to cross the fence that separates Spain
from Morocco, since it threatens the human rights defined by
the United Nations Organization (UN). As well as ending the
criminalization of migrants and stop linking them with cases
of violence, theft or terrorism. Therefore, a “solidarity Europe”
is necessary.
Italy: 5 Star Movement and Lega
The 5 Star Movement is disappointed with the current European
Union project in its communication strategy on Twitter. The
problem lies in the austerity policies raised by the European
Parliament after the global economic crisis. As they say, these
types of policies did not work. Contrarily, “they have destroyed
the lives of Italian citizens.”
In this sense, the 5 Star Movement attributes all responsibility
about what happens in Europe to the European Parliament since
they are responsible for the mismanagement of issues such as the
economic crisis, or the refugee crisis and therefore have generated
a strong disaffection among citizens concerning the European
political project.
Criticisms of the European Union by the 5 Star Movement
revolve around two axes: the economy and immigration.
Regarding the economy, in numerous messages they appeal to
the need to implement an economic patriotism that prioritizes
internal trade over foreign trade. On the one hand, they
emphasize that, instead of helping them to overcome the
economic crisis, austerity policies promoted by the European
authorities have reduced Italy’s ability to compete with the rest
of the world’s economies, something they consider essential if
Europe wants Italy to be a member of the common project.
Therefore, they raise the need to implement a minimum wage in
Europe to keep all countries at the same level. The objective is to
combat relocation and prevent Italian companies from moving
to other countries simply because labor costs are lower in them.
On the other hand, the 5 Star Movement also espouses
the need to promote employment policies. In this regard, they
propose the so-called “Dignity Decree” as a model, approved
by the Italian Parliament during August. With this project,
the Italian government has decided on reducing the maximum
duration of temporary contracts, offering a 50% discount on
taxes paid by the employee during the next 3 years and has
increased the compensation that the worker must receive in case
of unfair dismissal. In this regard, they also propose that Europe
increases funds for educational programs, research and business
as a mechanism to stop the brain drain and to reward excellence.
Regarding immigration, the 5 Star Movement considers that
given its location in the Mediterranean Sea, Italy receives a very
high number of immigrants. They recognize that “the borders
of Italy are the borders of Europe,” but they consider that the
European Union does not consider all countries to be equal
when it legislates on this issue. The 5 Star Movement argues that
Italians feel aggrieved because in recent years they have assumed
most of the migratory flow that reached the Mediterranean,
so they feel “alone” facing a problem they consider global. In
this regard, they believe that Europe must work together to
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allocate and divide the distribution of migrants equally among
all countries.
Therefore, the 5 Star Movement reclaim the original project
on which the European Union was founded on its creation. They
“firmly believe” in a Europe based on the foundational principles
that inspired it. That is to say: solidarity, dignity, democracy,
freedom, and equality. For them, it is necessary to recover these
values to move together toward the future and “the European
elections held on May are a unique opportunity to start changing
Europe.” For the 5 Star Movement the main goal is that “Italy
plays an important role in European decision-making again.”
The Lega has developed an intense electoral campaign on
social media platforms such as Twitter to manage the 2019
European elections. For Italians, the problems of the people
are mainly summarized in two: the economy and immigration.
Regarding the first, the party presents a very protectionist vision
of the economy since they defend Italian products against those
imported from Europe. In this way, they believe that winning in
Europe would guarantee the protection of the Italian industry
and commerce, which in several cases has been harmed by the
lack of tariffs. Italians do not perceive Italy to be among the great
countries of the European Union. This must be solved to become
the country that was in past decades and, therefore, they want
Italy to play a leading role within the European Union.
Immigration may be the issue that most worries the Lega.
They talk about it in numerous messages, always using a negative
tone and linking migrants to aspects such as insecurity or
illegality. In addition, they consider that the distribution of
immigrants among the countries of the European Union has
not turned out to be as equitable as it should. Likewise, the
5 Star Movement, the Lega feels aggrieved by the distribution
of immigrants among the countries that conform to the
European Union, given that the bulk of immigration arrives
in the Mediterranean and Italy is expected to welcome them
and provide them asylum. However, the Lega manifest a
much more restrictive and even xenophobic attitude that
defends the prohibition of immigrants entering Italy. This
aspect triggered numerous disagreements within the government
coalition formed by the 5 StarMovement and the Lega, and ended
in a rupture in August 2019. Therefore, they aspire to win in
Europe to defend the Italian borders.
Mateo Salvini promotes the creation of a different Europe that
“defends security, values traditional family and Christianity.” The
leader of the Lega links immigration with illegality and insecurity
and capitalizes on the increase of immigration to transfer citizens
a sense of fear and insecurity connected to the fact that Italy
cannot control its borders and, therefore, cannot dominate the
migratory flow by being part of the EuropeanUnion. He proposes
that only immigrants who have permission can cross European
borders. Therefore, Salvini defends the creation of a wall as a
mechanism to stop immigration such as the one approved by
the Hungarian government. In this regard, it is significant how
the Lega made numerous allusions to the Hungarian government
led by Viktor Orbán during the entire campaign. They consider
this government an essential ally to build “a new Europe” in
which the defense of national sovereignty and the struggle against
immigration prevail. Thus, the Lega seeks the tightening of
legislation to curb immigration, both legal and illegal, in Italy,
encouraging a patriotism similar to the one defended by Marine
Le Pen in France or Donald Trump in the United States.
The Lega argues that “Europe should not forget its origins.”
However, they consider that the union is currently very far from
what it was in the beginning since it is further from the people,
and only protects the welfare of a few States. To move forward,
Europe cannot forget its origins and the countries that conform
it up cannot abandon their own culture, traditions and identity.
In this context, the party led by Mateo Salvini is presented on
Twitter as the only solution for Europe, the “uncomfortable
option for the European Union,” and the only one able to solve
the problems of the people. Their goal is to change Europe to
“guarantee the future of our children,” a Europe “in which our
children can dream.” To do this, Europe needs “a change,” a great
reform that will take us to “a new Europe,” a “diverse Europe,” far
from the bureaucrats and bankers who have moved the European
Union away from the people. Again, as observed in Vox, the
Lega activates the differentiation between the people and the
elite of populist discourse. By facing the economic elites of the
European Union, the Lega will guarantee the sovereignty of the
Italian people.
France: Rassemblement National and France
Insoumise
Rassemblement National has a very belligerent attitude toward
the European Union on Twitter. The French populists believe
that the European Union, a technocratic institution that works as
a prison, does not represent the millenary Europe formed by the
united peoples. The Brussels institutions, such as the European
Commission, are made of officials. These organizations have the
power and make the decisions, instead of the Parliament, chosen
by the citizens of all European countries. In this regard, they
argue that the Commission has no legitimacy to make decisions
and, therefore, it is currently imposing guidelines that do not
correspond to its authority. They consider this to be “totalitarian
and undemocratic.”
Migration policies carried out by the European Union
particularly concern Rassemblement National. They argue on
Twitter that “borders are necessary for life because there is no
living organism able to survive without finding food abroad and
rejecting obstacles.” This statement means that immigration is an
obstacle to the French interests and, therefore, must be rejected.
Thus, they oppose the quotas of immigrants established by the
European Union, since they consider that receiving more than
400,000 immigrants a year is too much. In addition, they claim
that the Schengen treaty must be revoked, given that displaced
workers steal employment from French workers, and protecting
national workers must be a priority. They establish that before
“accepting the miseries of the entire world,” the European Union
should look for its people and put an end to these decisions
that only bring “poverty, unemployment, and insecurity.” In this
sense, they consider that returning borders to European countries
is a measure of “common sense,” both in the economic field and
on national security.
Besides, the party clearly and directly links immigration with
terrorism. The criticism of the management of the migration
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crisis undertook by the European Union is reinforced with the
praises made to “allies” such as Vladimir Putin’s Russia or Mateo
Salvini’s Italy and their immigration management. Moreover,
since they are currently “exposed to unprecedented migration
flows,” they consider being exposed to terrorism. They even
believe that along with those refugees fleeing the war in Syria,
there are infiltrated terrorists from the Islamic State, who take
advantage of the humanitarian aid to cross European borders and
commit terrorist attacks, such as those suffered in April 2018.
Using this type of messages on Twitter, Rassemblement
National seeks to generate fear and insecurity among citizens and
present themselves as the only political option that will protect
them from immigration and its consequences. For this party,
immigrants are not included in the people. Immigrants are the
others, a collective trying to take away the rights of citizens.
Despite the disparity that characterizes immigration, they portray
them as a homogeneous collective against which the people
must fight to keep their rights. This way, they link immigration
with the lack of job opportunities or with the reduction
of social assistance, generating a negative representation of
immigration in the collective imaginary of the French. Activating
the friend/enemy axis (Schmitt, 2005) they seek to foster
confrontation between the two groups, an aspect that can
generate aggressions or vexations on the part of ultra-groups
against people from other countries.
For this reason, Rassemblement National proposes to end the
European Union as we know it today. Thus, in front of the
European Union of technocrats, they propose a Europe formed
by “free, sovereign and independent nations.” This way, each
nation will be able to legislate to protect their people, instead of
the current situation where a few decide what is best for everyone,
an aspect that the French populists consider to be seriously
damaging them on issues such as the economy or immigration.
Rassemblement National strives to link the loss of sovereignty
of the European Union with leaders such as Emmanuel Macron,
president of the French republic, or Angela Merkel, the German
chancellor. These leaders, according to the French populists, act
against the people.
In the same line with the argument presented by
Rassemblement National on Twitter, the France Insoumise
consider that the European Union is not Europe since the
European Union is currently a single market where citizens are
subject to the dictatorship of banks and finances. Very critical of
the austerity policies implemented during the last decade, they
believe that France must withdraw from the European treaties
that feed social and fiscal dumping, as they are annihilating
public investments as well as frustrating the application of social
policies. They place the accent on the lack of investment in
healthcare or in fighting against gender violence.
In line with these are the criticisms to Emmanuel Macron
since he is submitting to the mandate of the European
Commission and, therefore, to the oligarchies and the liberal
economic measures that use European treaties as mechanisms of
execution to control the people. This way, they propose European
elections as a plebiscite against Macron and the liberal policies of
the European Union. Other things that they disapprove of the
European Union and Macron are the inaction against climate
change. Given the state of a climatic and ecological emergency,
and the consequent loss of species, they claim that the European
authorities are doing nothing. For this reason, they appeal for the
environmentalist’s vote in the European elections in the face of
this climatic emergency. Besides, they defend the need to address
the consequences of climate change and study how to prevent
it. To suspend direct and indirect subsidies, to fossil energies,
to bet on a 100% renewable energy future, to lead a common
ecological agricultural policy for quality food, to build a Europe of
zero waste where the circular economy is established are among
their proposals.
Finally, given the refugee crisis that Europe has suffered in
recent years, they defend the need to address the causes of
immigration. They argue that “migrating is a pain, a necessity”
as nobody leaves a country and a family for pleasure. Therefore,
migrants should be treated with dignity. In this sense, borders
should not serve to prevent people from fleeing war or a
complicated situation in their countries of origin, but must
be used primarily as a tool to impose taxes on tax traps and
multinationals practicing tax evasion.
The France Insoumise present themselves as revolutionary on
Twitter, as “the only ones capable of fighting against the extreme
right and the extreme liberalism,” as “the only ones able to protect
the people with solidarity and national sovereignty.” They define
themselves as combat deputies, consistent and representative.
Thus, each vote for the France Insoumise will serve to stand up
to Brussels, to oppose Macron and its policies, and to strengthen
its electoral program. In addition, they argue that they are not
on their own, but have an alliance with parties such as Podemos
in Spain, the Bloco in Portugal, or their Nordic allies, who will
fight for the people. They want a “peace Europe” that brings social
progress, democracy, emancipation, assuming responsibility to
fight against climate change and ecological disaster. They define
their project as humanist since they seek to live in peace and
harmony with the rest of human beings, nature and animals,
proposing a non-competitive Europe, based on cooperation,
freedom, equality and fraternity among people, European nations
and the rest of the world.
United Kingdom: The Brexit Party and UKIP
The Brexit Party was launched on the 20th of January 2019. The
party led by Nigel Farage, ex-leader of the UKIP, seeks to attract
those conservative and Labor voters supporting the British exit
from the European Union. Due to its recent creation and its short
history, The Brexit Party does not present a detailed electoral
program and its communicative strategy on Twitter presents few
messages focusing mainly on the issue of Brexit.
Europe’s main problem is the loss of sovereignty resulting
from becoming a member of the European project. Thus, they
attribute all responsibility to the establishment, who legislate
thinking about the benefit of a few States. In this context, they
blame not only the bureaucrats of Brussels but also the two
great parties governing the political life of the United Kingdom
for centuries: Labor and Conservatives. They consider that “the
bipartisan system is broken” because both parties broke their
promises and will end up losing millions of followers if they
negotiate with the European Union something other than Brexit.
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The loss of sovereignty has generated the impossibility of
legislating on fundamental issues such as the opening or closing
of borders, or aspects related to employment, as well as the
obligation to implement the treaties approved by the European
Union, such as Schengen, which allows the free movement of
people between the Member States. For The Brexit Party, Brexit
is the only possible solution. The only way to recover the lost
sovereignty and to be able to decide the future of the British is to
leave the European Union. Therefore, they encourage supporters
of Brexit, the so-called Brexiteers, to join the party and vote for
them in the European elections. They define themselves as a
movement for democracy, seeking to gather under their wing all
those who consider themselves as “Democrats in favor of leaving
the European Union and willing to change politics for the better.”
Only this way can the United Kingdom “recover its reputation in
the world.”
Moreover, we should point out that a large part of the
messages published by The Brexit Party on Twitter regarding
the electoral campaign refers to the electoral acts that occurred
throughout the United Kingdom in May. These messages
commonly contain images with party leaders surrounded by
citizens. With this, they may want to demonstrate having a large
number of followers despite its short history.
The communicative strategy of the UKIP on Twitter has
followed the same line as the one executed by The Brexit Party.
Their messages focus on highlighting the consequences of the
loss of sovereignty for the United Kingdom. In this context, the
UKIP blames the current situation of the British on both Theresa
May and Jeremy Corbyn, two politicians they harshly criticize.
Also, they attack emblematic figures such as Tony Blair since he
wanted to negotiate a second referendum. Since the mandate of
the people has been to leave the European Union, they consider
that negotiating the conditions for the United Kingdom to leave
is a “humiliation” for the British political class. For the UKIP
the result of the referendum was clear, so the British government
must abide by the people’s decision and leave the EuropeanUnion
without objecting or negotiating anything. They must simply
leave as soon as possible. In addition, against those arguing that
Brexit would harm business, the UKIP states that politicians like
Corbyn or May are the ones damaging the economy with their
efforts to remain in the European Union and to hold a second
referendum. Not only that, but they consider that the position
of both parties and their leaders are detrimental to the future of
the nation.
“The great revolution in the history of mankind, past, present,
and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free.”
Using this quote pronounced by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the
35th president of the United States, they defend the idea that
the establishment will not be able to stop the departure of the
United Kingdom. The British people will manage to abandon the
“corrupt” European Union using their mandate.
In line with the events linked to Brexit, the UKIP advocates
that the only possible solution is leaving the European Union. It
is too late for restoring the European Union as other countries
claim. Therefore, one of the slogans of the campaign that they
used as a hashtag on Twitter is #MakeBrexitHappen. The British
people are urged to vote UKIP if they want Brexit to be real,
whether or not there is a deal. Since its creation (27 years ago) the
UKIP has been fighting to make Brexit happen. Also, they declare
that the United Kingdom must regain sovereignty. They argue
that they “have a plan,” which is to leave the European Union.
They also claim “to have the necessary support from the people
to execute it.” Furthermore, they emphasize that, if it wasn’t for
them, there would have never been a referendum.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis carried out allows extracting the main discursive
axes that the eight European populist parties analyzed present
in their communicative strategy on Twitter regarding the
European political project and Euroscepticism (Table 2). Thus,
the activation of the four functions of the framing theory
described by Entman (1993) can be identified: definition of the
problem, attribution of responsibilities, moral assessment and
approach to a solution.
The populist political parties analyzed believe that the main
problem (the first function of framing by Entman) related to the
European Union lies in the loss of sovereignty when belonging
to this institution as member states must abide by certain
policies they disagree with. These policies benefit some and
harm others. Belonging to supranational organizations causes
the loss of sovereignty since the State loses control to legislate,
and therefore it is unable to rectify adverse economic or social
situations. Vox, Lega, Rassemblement National, the UKIP and
The Brexit Party defend in their Twitter profiles an idea of
national sovereignty based on ethnic and isolationist values.
These parties are actively fighting against the external enemy. On
the contrary, France Insoumise defines sovereignty as a social and
democratic issue that implies achieving equality for the people.
This means that their interests prevail over those of the elite.
In this sense, it is interesting to note how populist right-wing
parties link immigration to the loss of sovereignty and to the
national security problems that involve, with special attention
to the inability to close borders as a result of the prohibition of
European treaties (the third function of framing by Entman). In
contrast, France Insoumise links the loss of sovereignty to a more
social aspect such as climate change and the inefficiency of the
European Union to address it, as well as the need to address the
causes that have led so many people to emigrate and leave their
home countries.
The exception to this point is Podemos and the 5 Star
Movement. They consider austerity policies imposed on the
Member States since the beginning of the global economic crisis
in 2008 as the main problem of the European Union. From
their view, these measures have proved highly ineffective since
they have deteriorated the life of citizens. For Podemos, austerity
policies have resulted in the discrediting of the European Union,
which on the one hand implies an increase of the far-right parties
demanding to leave the institution and, on the other, the EU
seems to be at the service of the markets instead of serving
the people. The 5 Star Movement believes that, in addition
to aggravating the economic crisis, austerity has triggered a
migration crisis that Europe has failed to manage, appealing
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TABLE 2 | Summary of the main discursive axes of European populist parties.
Party/frame
function
1. Definition of the
problem
2. Attribution of responsibilities 3. Moral assessment 4. Solution
Vox (Spain) Loss of sovereignty Brussels oligarchy National Security Issues—Borders Total re-foundation of the EU. Loss of
power of Brussels and that member
states legislate based on their
interests.
Podemos (Spain) Austerity policies Brussels financial system and elites Brexit, far right parties, Europe at the
service of markets and climate
change




Austerity policies Brussels financial system and elites Economic mismanagement and
migration management—Economic
patriotism
Redefinition of the EU. Recover
foundational values
Lega (Italy) Loss of sovereignty Bankers and bureaucrats National Security Issues—Borders Total EU re-foundation
Rassemblement
National (France)
Loss of sovereignty EU technocrats and world leaders
like Macron or Merkel




Loss of sovereignty Oligarchy of Brussels and
Emmanuel Macron




Loss of sovereignty European institutions and British
conservatives and Labor
National Security Issues—Borders To leave the EU
UKIP (UK) Loss of sovereignty European institutions and British
conservatives and Labor
National Security Issues—Borders To leave the EU
to the need for an economic patriotism that prioritizes the
welfare of the Italians. In short, we observe how, in general
terms, the main problem for radical right populist parties is
the loss of sovereignty, whereas for the left-populist parties is
austerity policies.
In this context, the responsibility of the problems that the
EuropeanUnion has (the second function of framing by Entman)
varies depending on the parties. Again, Podemos and the 5
Star Movement coincide in their analysis and point to the
financial system and the elites of Brussels as the culprits of
the bad situation experienced by the European political project.
In a similar line are the criticisms of the Lega since they
blame bankers and bureaucrats. As the party led by Matteo
Salvini argues on Twitter, they are the actors who truly run the
European Union and accuse them of legislating for the benefit
of countries like Germany. Vox, Rassemblement National and
France Insoumise are committed to blaming the oligarchies of
Brussels and some leaders such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel
Macron. It is noteworthy that the French populist parties accuse
the president of their country of not being belligerent enough
to fight for the rights of the French in the European Union,
and obeying the orders of leaders from other countries such as
Merkel. Finally, the British populists agree in their diagnosis and
attribute all responsibility to the European institutions and the
leaders of the Conservative Party, Theresa May, and the Labor
Party, Jeremy Corbyn, for not fulfilling the will of the British
people to abandon the European Union. Thus, we observe two
types of strategies regarding the attribution of responsibility.
The first is to blame political and economic instances in an
abstract way. The second, present in the communicative strategy
of the French and British populists, is to criticize European
politics in a national way, blaming the political leaders of their
respective countries.
The moral valuation (the third function of framing by
Entman) that populist parties develop also differs depending
on their ideology. For radical right populist parties, the loss
of sovereignty implies problems of national security, especially
with regard to the opening and closing of borders. All of them
stress the fact that they disagree with free movement of people
and that they are willing to restrict the entry of immigrants
into their respective countries, an aspect that the European
Union membership does not allow state governments to do. The
moral assessment made by the left-wing populist parties varies
depending on their profiles. For Podemos, austerity policies have
led to the emergence and consolidation of far-right political
options aiming to end the existing European political project.
In addition, they highlight the lack of actions regarding issues
such as climate change, a highly problematic issue that requires
urgent action. France Insoumise agrees on the latter assessment
as they also emphasize that the European Union has avoided
taking measures to tackle the migration crisis. Finally, the 5
Star Movement considers that austerity policies have generated
both economic and migratory problems, an aspect that has
caused the emergence of the so-called economic patriotism in
countries such as Italy or France. These groups seek to improve
the lives of national citizens as opposed to the lives of people
from abroad.
Finally, the analysis has detected that the European populist
parties propose three types of solutions (the fourth function
of framing by Entman) to respond to the problems that the
European political project is going through. First, the center
and left-wing populist parties (Podemos, the 5 Star Movement,
and France Insoumise) present ideas based on the need to
recover the foundational principles that inspired the creation
of the European Union, such as solidarity, cooperation or
freedom. Secondly, the radical right populist parties such as
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Vox, Rassemblement National and the Lega believe that the
only possible way is to execute a total re-foundation of the
European Union, removing the power from Brussels to grant it
to the States, to create a sort of Europe for the people. Thirdly
and finally, the British populists present the strongest solution:
leaving the European Union. For the UKIP and The Brexit Party
the only possible option for the United Kingdom is to leave
the institution since only then can they become a sovereign
state, able to make its own decisions. Thus, we observe how
ideology is a determining factor in the choice of the type of
solution to apply. While the left-wing populist parties bet on a
more constructive discourse aspiring to return to the beginning
of the European political project, the radical right populist
parties present a negative discourse based on the recovery of the
sovereignty ceded by the member states, or on the exit of the
European Union.
In this sense, Eurosceptic attitudes have been observed in the
communicative strategies on Twitter of all the European populist
parties analyzed, regardless of their trajectory and ideology.
DISCUSSION
The results obtained in this research enable us to make
two innovative contributions. On the one hand, the analysis
conducted permit us to point out that the European populist
parties studied, regardless of their ideology, run as Eurosceptic
options, presenting a critical discourse on Twitter against the
European political project. This aspect enables adding another
dimension to the communicative style of populism (Jagers
and Walgrave, 2007). On the other hand, this analysis also
allows us to identify the dominant frames revolving around
Euroscepticism: the loss of sovereignty and the austerity policies
as the main problem of the European political project or the
re-foundation, redefinition or abandonment of the European
Union as a possible solution. In this case, ideology operates as a
determining factor.
In response to RQ1, the presence of Euroscepticism has been
detected in the messages of the Twitter accounts of the eight
populist parties studied, regardless of their ideology. Although
previous studies highlighted that Euroscepticism is normally
representative of radical right populist parties (Wodak, 2015),
this analysis has identified that it is also currently present in
the communication strategies posed on Twitter by left-wing
populist parties. Following the assumptions raised by Taggart and
Szczerbiak (2002), we observed a “soft” form of Euroscepticism
in the communication strategy of the left-wing populist parties
on Twitter in which they disapprove some European Union
policies. By contrast, right-wing populist parties are opposed to
the process of European integration and want to re-found the
European Union, an aspect that could be considered a “hard”
form of Euroscepticism.
European populist actors, especially radical right populist
parties, take advantage of citizens’ frustration (Eurobarometer,
20181, 20192) to promote Eurosceptic discourse among users
and to launch harsh criticism against the main leaders of the
European Union as well as leaders from countries like Germany
or France. The populist parties analyzed approve the founding
principles of the European Union but are against those running
the institution (Mudde, 2007). Thus, in addition to the appeal to
the people and the criticism of the elites, Euroscepticism is also
incorporated as an identity element of the rhetoric of European
populist parties (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007).
Given the barriers imposed by conventional media, the
analyzed populist political actors feed on the values inherent
in the digital media system to favor their communication
(Engesser et al., 2017b), thus taking advantage of the structure of
online opportunity (Engesser et al., 2017a). Following a similar
strategy to that employed by certain social movements, such
as 15M (Casero-Ripollés and Feenstra, 2012) or the Platform
of People Affected by Mortgage (Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-
Ripollés, 2016), populist political actors spread their messages
on Twitter underlining the specific aspects that interest them the
most, depending on their ideology.
In this sense, answering the RQ2, it has been identified that
ideological differences do influence how messages dealing with
the European Union are framed. Activating the four functions
of the framing theory described by Entman (1993) in their
discursive strategy on Twitter, populist parties have defined the
problem, attributed the relevant responsibilities, made a moral
assessment and, finally, raised a possible solution. The way of
posing these functions is different in the communicative strategy
on Twitter of the analyzed populist parties. They emphasize
certain aspects or others depending on whether they are radical
right or left-wing populist parties.
Globalization, embodied by supranational organizations such
as the European Union, detracts sovereignty from the people
(Mammone, 2009), while the State loses part of the control
to legislate. At this point, in line with what was argued by
authors such as Gerbaudo (2017), the question of sovereignty is
the meeting point between left-wing and right-wing populism.
The difference between the two lies in how they are proposing
to reestablish the union (Gerbaudo, 2018). While the radical
right populist parties bet on leaving the European Union or re-
founding it to completely change it, the left-wing populist parties
present a constructive discourse. In line with what was stated by
other authors (Casero-Ripollés et al., 2017), these parties do not
want to leave the European Union, but they do seek to improve
their position within it. This creates a transnational nationalism
shared by those states led by political options with the same
ideology that support the same measures regarding issues such
as the European Union’s membership or immigration. This is
corroborated by those messages in which they show their support
to their allies, as occurs between Rassemblement National and
the Liga or between France Insoumise and Podemos. Thus,
uniting each other and sharing arguments, they take advantage
of the political opportunity structure to gain strength before both
citizens and European Parliament (Hall, 2000).
The results of this comparative study show that
Euroscepticism is an attribute present in the communicative
strategy on Twitter of European populist parties of both left and
right. However, there are significant differences with respect
to the frame of the messages related to the European Union,
highlighting some aspects or others depending on ideology.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org 10 August 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 54
Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés Populism Against Europe Social Media
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
the corresponding author.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
LA-M collected data, conducted data analysis, developed the
concept of the manuscript, and wrote the paper. AC-R wrote the
paper and reviewed it. All authors contributed to the article and
approved the submitted version.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the State Research Agency
(AEI) of the Spanish Government under Grant CSO
2017-88620-P.
REFERENCES
Aalberg, T., and de Vreese, C. H. (2017). “Introduction: comprehending populist
political communication,” in Populist Political Communication in Europe, eds
T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, and C. H. de Vreese (New
York, NY: Routledge), 3–25.
Abts, K., and Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democracy. Polit. Stud. 55,
405–424. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00657.x
Albertazzi, D., and McDonnell, D. (eds.). (2008). “Introduction: the sceptre and
the spectre,” in Twenty-First Century Populism, (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan), 1–11.
Alonso-Muñoz, L. (2019). The “more is more” effect: a comparative analysis of the
political agenda and the strategy on Twitter of the European populist parties.
Eur. Polit. Soc. 20, 1–15. doi: 10.1080/23745118.2019.1672921
Alonso-Muñoz, L., and Casero-Ripollés, A. (2016). La influencia del discurso
sobre cambio social en la agenda de los medios. El caso de la Plataforma
de Afectados por la Hipoteca. OBETS. Rev. Ciencias Social. 11, 25–51.
doi: 10.14198/OBETS2016.11.1.02
Alonso-Muñoz, L., and Casero-Ripollés, A. (2018). Communication of European
populist leaders on Twitter: agenda setting and the “more is less” effect. El Prof.
Información 27, 1193–1202. doi: 10.3145/epi.2018.nov.03
Atton, C. (2006). Far-right media on internet: culture, discourse and power. New
Media Soc. 8, 573–587. doi: 10.1177/1461444806065653
Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., and Littler, M. (2011). The New Face of Digital Populism.
London: Demos.
Bennett, W. L., and Manheim, J. B. (2006). The one-step flow of communication.
Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 608, 213–232. doi: 10.1177/0002716206292266
Bergbauer, S., Jamet, J.-F., Schölermann, H., Stracca, L., and Stubenrauch,
C. (2019). Global Lessons From Euroscepticism. VOX. CEPR Policy Portal.
Available online at: https://voxeu.org/article/global-lessons-euroscepticism
Block, E., and Negrine, R. (2017). The populist communication style: toward a
critical framework. Int. J. Commun. 11, 178–197.
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., and de Vreese, C. H. (2010). Media coverage of
rightwing populist leaders. Communications 35, 141–163. doi: 10.1515/comm.
2010.008
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., and de Vreese, C. H. (2011). How the media
shape perceptions of right-wing populist leaders. Polit. Commun. 28, 182–206.
doi: 10.1080/10584609.2011.564605
Burson-Marsteller (2018). Twiplomacy Study 2018. Twiplomacy. Available online
at: https://twiplomacy.com/blog/twiplomacy-study-2018/
Butler, J. (2014). “‘Nosotros el pueblo.” Apuntes sobre la libertad de reunión,” in
¿Qué es un pueblo?, eds A. Badiou, J. Butler, G. Didi-Huberman, S. Khiari, and
J. Rancière (Buenos Aires: Eterna Cadencia), 229–242.
Caiani, M., and Graziano, P. (2016). Varieties of populism: insights from the Italian
case. Rivista Italiana Sci. Politica 46, 243–267. doi: 10.1017/ipo.2016.6
Canovan, M. (2002). “Taking politics to the people: populism as the ideology of
democracy,” in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, eds Y. Mény and Y.
Surel (New York, NY: Palgrave), 25–44.
Casero-Ripollés, A., and Feenstra, R. A. (2012). The 15-M movement and the
new media: a case study of how new themes were introduced into Spanish
political discourse. Media Int. Aust. 144, 68–76. doi: 10.1177/1329878X12144
00111
Casero-Ripollés, A., Feenstra, R. A., and Tormey, S. (2016). Old and new
media logics in an electoral campaign: the case of Podemos and the
two-way street mediatization of politics. Int. J. Press Polit. 21, 378–397.
doi: 10.1177/1940161216645340
Casero-Ripollés, A., Sintes-Olivella, M., and Franch, P. (2017). The populist
political communication style in action: podemos’s issues and functions on
Twitter during the 2016 Spanish general election. Am. Behav. Sci. 61, 986–1001.
doi: 10.1177/0002764217707624
Chiaramonte, A., Emanuele, V., Maggini, N., and Paparo, A. (2018). Populist
success in a Hung parliament: the 2018 general election in Italy. South Eur. Soc.
Polit. 23, 479–501. doi: 10.1080/13608746.2018.1506513
Colleoni, E., Rozza, A., and Arvidsson, A. (2014). Echo chamber or public sphere?
Predicting political orientation and measuring political homophily in Twitter
using big data. J. Commun. 64, 317–332. doi: 10.1111/jcom.12084
de Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., and Stanyer, J. (2018).
Populism as an expression of political communication content and style: a
new perspective. Int. J. Press Polit. 23, 423–438. doi: 10.1177/19401612187
90035
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., and Büchel, F. (2017a). Populism and social
media. How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Inf. Commun. Soc. 20,
1109–1126. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697
Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., and Larsson, A. O. (2017b). Populist online
communication: introduction to the special issue. Inf. Commun. Soc. 20,
1272–1292. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. J.
Commun. 43, 51–58. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x
Esser, F., Stepinska, A., and Hopmann, D. (2017). “Populism and the media: cross-
national findings and perspectives,” in Populist Political Communication in
Europe, eds T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, and C. H. de
Vreese (New York, NY: Routledge), 365–380.
Flesher Fominaya, C. (2015). Redefining the crisis/redefining democracy:
mobilising for the right to housing in Spain’s PAH Movement. South Eur. Soc.
Polit. 20, 465–485. doi: 10.1080/13608746.2015.1058216
Fuchs, C. (2017). Donald Trump: a critical theory-perspective on authoritarian
capitalism. tripleC Commun. Cap. Crit. 15, 1–72. doi: 10.31269/triplec.
v15i1.835
Gainous, J., and Wagner, K. M. (2014). Tweeting to power. The Social Media
Revolution in American Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gamson, W. A. (2004). On a sociology of the media. Polit. Commun. 21, 305–307.
doi: 10.1080/10584600490481334
Gerbaudo, P. (2014). “Populism 2.0,” in Social Media, Politics and The State:
Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter
and YouTube, eds D. Trottier and C. Fuchs (New York, NY: Routledge), 16–67.
Gerbaudo, P. (2017). The populist era. Soundings 65, 46–58.
Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: an elective affinity? Media Cult.
Soc. 40, 745–753. doi: 10.1177/0163443718772192
Graham, T., Broersma, M., and Hazelhoff, K. (2013). “Closing the gap: Twitter
as an instrument for connected representation,” in The Media, Political
Participation and Empowerment, eds R. Scullion, R. Gerodimos, D. Jackson, and
D. Lilleker (London: Routledge), 71–88.
Groshek, J., and Engelbert, J. (2013). Double differentiation in a cross-national
comparision of populist political movements and online media uses in
the United States and the Netherlands. New Media Soc. 15, 183–202.
doi: 10.1177/1461444812450685
Guerrero-Solé, F. (2018). Interactive behavior in political discussions on
Twitter: politicians, media, and citizens’ patterns of interaction in the
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org 11 August 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 54
Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés Populism Against Europe Social Media
2015 and 2016 electoral campaigns in Spain. Soc. Media Soc. 4, 1–16.
doi: 10.1177/2056305118808776
Hall, J. A. (2000). Estado y Nación: Ernest Gellner y la Teoría del Nacionalismo.
Madrid: Cambridge University Press.
Hameleers, M. (2018). A typology of populism: toward a revised theoretical
framework on the sender side and receiver side of communication. Int. J.
Commun. 12, 2171–2190.
Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO97805
11730245
Ivaldi, G. (2018). Contesting the EU in times of crisis: The Front
National and politics of Euroscepticism in France. Politics 38, 278–294.
doi: 10.1177/0263395718766787
Jackson, N. A., and Lilleker, D. (2011). Microblogging, constituency service and
impression management: UK MPs and the use of Twitter. J. Legis. Stud. 17,
86–105. doi: 10.1080/13572334.2011.545181
Jagers, J., and Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: an
empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. Eur. J. Polit. Res. 46,
319–345. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x
Jamieson, K. H., and Cappella, J. N. (2008). Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the
Conservative Media Establishment. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Koopmans, R., and Olzak, S. (2004). Discursive opportunities and the
evolution of right-wing violence in Germany. Am. J. Sociol. 110, 198–230.
doi: 10.1086/386271
Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: a conceptual clarification and some theses on
its effects. Commun. Theory 24, 42–60. doi: 10.1111/comt.12029
Kriesi, H. (1995). “The political opportunity structure of new social movements:
Its impact on their mobilization,” in The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative
Perspectives on States and Social Movements, ed J. C. Jenkins (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press).
Kriesi, H. (2007). The role of European integration in national election campaigns.
Eur. Union Polit. 8, 83–108. doi: 10.1177/1465116507073288
Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. West Eur. Polit. 37, 361–378.
doi: 10.1080/01402382.2014.887879
Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. London: Verso.
Leconte, C. (2010). Understanding Euroscepticism. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Lorey, I. (2015). State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious. London: Verso.
Mammone, A. (2009). The eternal return? Faux populism and contemporarization
of neo-fascism across Britain, France and Italy. J. Conemp. Eur. Stud. 17,
171–192. doi: 10.1080/14782800903108635
Mazzoleni, G. (2003). “The media and the growth of neo-populism in
contemporary democracies,” in The Media and Neo-Populism, eds G.
Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, and B. Horsfield (London: Praeger), 1–23.
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). “Populism and the media,” in Twenty-First Century
Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, eds D. Albertazzi and
D. McDonnell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), 49–64.
McLaren, L. M. (2006). Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Moffitt, B. (2016). The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and
Representation. Stanford: Stanford Univeristy. doi: 10.2307/j.ctvqsdsd8
Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. Gov. Oppos. 39, 541–563.
doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511492037
Pencheva, D., and Maronitis, K. (2018). Fetishizing sovereignty in the remain
and leave campaigns. Eur. Polit. Soc. 19, 526–539. doi: 10.1080/23745118.
2018.1468948
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The nucleus of populism: in search of the lowest common
denominator. Gov. Oppos. 49, 537–599. doi: 10.1017/gov.2013.30
Rooduijn, M., and Akkerman, T. (2017). Flank attacks: populism and
left right radicalism in Western Europe. Party Polit. 23, 193–204.
doi: 10.1177/1354068815596514
Rovira Kaltwasser, C., and Taggart, P. (2016). Dealing with populists in
government: a framework for analysis. Democratization 23, 201–220.
doi: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1058785
Schmitt, C. (2005). Concepto de lo Político. Madrid: Alianza.
Shoemaker, P. J., and Vos, T. P. (2009). Gatekeeping Theory. New York,
NY: Routledge.
Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Republic.com. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Concepts in the Social Sciences. Buckingham: Open
University Press.
Taggart, P., and Szczerbiak, A. (2002). “The party politics of euroscepticism in EU
member and candidate states,” in Opposing Europe Research Network Working
Paper (Turin), 6, 1–45.
Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and
Mass Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Usherwood, S. (2019). Shooting the fox? UKIP’s populism in the post-Brexit era.
West Eur. Polit. 42, 1–21. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1596692
Vaccari, C., and Valeriani, A. (2015). Follow the leader! Direct and indirect flows
of political communication during the 2013 Italian general election campaign.
New Media Soc. 17, 1025–1042. doi: 10.1177/1461444813511038
van Dijk, T. A. (2003). Ideología y Discurso: una Introducción Multidisciplinar.
Barcelona: Gedisa.
van Dijk, T. A. (2006). Ideology and discourse analysis. J. Polit. Ideol. 11, 115–140.
doi: 10.1080/13569310600687908
van Dijk, T. A. (2012). Discurso y Poder. Barcelona: Gedisa
van Elsas, E. J., Hakhverdian, A., and van der Brug, W. (2016). United
against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism
among left-wing and right-wing citizens. West Eur. Polit. 39, 1181–1204.
doi: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244
van Klingeren, M., Boomgaarden, H. G., and de Vreese, C. H. (2013). Going
soft or staying soft: have identity factors become more important than
economic rationale when explaining euroscepticism? J. Eur. Integr. 35,
689–704. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2012.719506
Vasilopoulou, S. (2018). “The radical right and Euroskepticism,” in The Oxford
Handbook of the Radical Right, ed J. Rydgren (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 122–140.
Verweij, P. (2012). Twitter links between politicians and journalists. J. Pract. 6,
680–691. doi: 10.1080/17512786.2012.667272
Wallerstein, I. (2004). World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a contested concept: populism in the study of Latin
American Politics. Comp. Polit. 34, 1–22. doi: 10.2307/422412
Wodak, R. (2015). The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean.
London: Sage.
Wodak, R., and Meyer, M. (2003). Métodos de Análisis Crítico del Discurso.
Barcelona: Gedisa.
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Alonso-Muñoz and Casero-Ripollés. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org 12 August 2020 | Volume 5 | Article 54
